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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT EISENSTAEDT,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No.: 900135 CA
Priority No.: 16

vs.
SEARS ROEBUCK CO., and
OTIS ELEVATOR,
Defendants/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT OTIS ELEVATOR

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is properly held by the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
The Supreme Court, prior to transfer, held jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court improperly denied a

motion for new trial based on the excessive damage rule
under Rule 59(a)(5).
The standard of review is whether the trial court's
denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion based upon

juror disregard of competent evidence or influence of passion
or prejudice, or a verdict manifestly against the weight of
evidence,

Battv v. Mitchell. 757 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah

1978), Price. Orem Inv. Co, v. Rawlins. Brown &
Gunnell. 713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986).
2.

Whether the trial court improperly denied a

new trial for insufficiency of the evidence based upon Rule
59(a)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The standard of review is whether, viewing the
evidence in light most favorable to the party who prevailed,
the court concludes the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict.

Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).

RULES
Rule 59(a)(5), (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(See Addendum for copy of the Rule verbatim.)
Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(See

Addendum for copy of the Rule verbatim.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a personal injury claim which
allegedly occurred in an Otis elevator at the Salt Lake
downtown Sears store. Mr. Eisenstaedt claimed the
elevator doors closed improperly causing him severe arm injury
and nerve damage.

The plaintiff pled negligence, breach of
-2-

warranty and strict liability.

Defendant Sears was dismissed

prior to trial.
A jury trial was held on July 17, 18 and 19, 1989.
The jury found Otis Elevator not negligent but returned a
verdict for Mr. Eisenstaedt under theories of breach of
warranty and strict liability.

Mr. Eisenstaedt was awarded

$17,250.00 in special damages plus $5,000.00 in general
damages.

The trial court denied defendant Otis Elevator's

Motion for New Trial, Remittitur, and Jury Notwithstanding the
Verdict and Otis has appealed the denials.

(See Addendum for

full copies of the jury verdict, judgment on the verdict,
Motions for New Trial, and Memorandum Denying Motions for New
Trial.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Prior to April 9, 1986, Mr. Eisenstaedt

suffered from partial paralysis from the hips down.
(Trial Transcript, p. 25, hereinafter "Tr.")

As a result of

his partial paralysis, Mr. Eisenstaedt has used crutches and
wheelchairs for ambulation.
2.

(Tr. at 149.)

On the afternoon of April 9, 1986,

Mr. Eisenstaedt and his wife were shopping at Sears. They
wanted to utilize the elevator.
wheelchair.

Mr. Eisenstaedt was in his

As the elevator doors opened, his wife began

pushing him into the elevator.

Mr. Eisenstaedt alleges that

-3-

the elevator doors closed prematurely, pinning his arms for two
to five seconds.
3.

(Tr. p. 32, 78.)
After he complained to Sears, Lisa Hurtado,

a Sears security officer, inspected Mr. Eisenstaedt's arms to
see if he was hurt.
normal.

(Tr. p. 337.)

(Tr. p. 339.)

His arms appeared

He did not have any bruises,

scraping, contusions, lacerations^ skin indentation, or
apparent physical injury.

(Tr. p. 338-39.)

Mr. Eisenstaedt refused Sears7 offer of medical care.

(Tr.

p. 339.)
4.

Mr. Eisenstaedt then left the store and,

utilizing his arms, drove 130 miles to Wendover, Nevada.
Tr. p. 81.)
5.

Several days later, Mr. Eisenstaedt saw

»r. Stream in Wendover, Nevada, complaining about pain in his
eft arm.

Dr. Stream referred him to Dr. John Provost.

(Tr.

». 38-39.)
6.

Dr. Provost is a board-certified orthopedic

pecialist working in St. Mark's Hospital.

(Tr. p. 91.)

nitially saw Mr. Eisenstaedt on April 30, 1986.

He

Based on

[r. Eisenstaedt's subjective complaints, Dr. Provost
tentatively diagnosed tennis elbow and immobilized the left arm
with a cast.

(Tr. p. 96, 251.)

The tennis elbow condition

was consistent with Mr. Eisenstaedt's use of crutches.
(Tr. p. 251.)
-4-

7.

Dr. Provost treated Mr. Eisenstaedt until

December 12, 1986.
8.

(Tr. p. 246.)

Between April 3, 1986 and December 23, 1986,

the plaintiff underwent five separate EMG and nerve study
tests.

None of the tests revealed significant problems.

(Tr. p. 251, p. 317, p. 319, p. 235, p. 320.)

The tests were

completed by Dr. Ron Duerksen, Dr. Walter Reichert, and
Dr. Dennis Thoen.
9.

Dr. Provost conducted grip strength tests but

concluded that Mr. Eisenstaedt was not giving full effort.
(Tr. p. 272.)

In preparation for trial, Robert DeBry &

Associates hired physical therapist Don Vernon to conduct
strength tests. The tests did show some disparity between the
right and left arms but were not substantiated by arm atrophy.
(Tr. p. 114, 134.)
10.

Dr. Provost started to find it difficult to

justify any disability or impairment rating because of the
minimal physical findings.

(Tr. p. 261.)

Ultimately, he

refused to assign any disability or impairment rating because
the injury was "no big deal" according to the test findings.
(Tr. p. 274.)
11.
his patient.

Dr. Provost also questioned the veracity of

He had a hard time equating Mr. Eisenstaedt,s

complaints with the fact that there was no arm atrophy, or any
positive EMG tests.

(Tr. p. 276.)
-5-

Dr. Provost testified

that in the absence of medical evidence, such complaints were
typical where the patient was after some secondary gain or had
an ulterior purpose.

(Tr. p. 277.)

Based on his findings,

Dr. Provost testified that the plaintiff should have reasonable
use of his arm.

(Tr. p. 275.)

12.

After the incident occurred, Otis repairman

Dave Joseph, immediately examined the elevator.
all components were working properly.

He found that

(Tr. p. 332.)

Repairman Mont Anderson also testified that the elevator was
working properly.

(Tr. p. 285.)

Lisa Hurtado checked the

elevator immediately after the incident found it was operating
safely.

(Tr. p. 343.)

Charlie Schott, an elevator

expert, testified that the elevator was fit for all its
intended purposes, did not have any dangerous defect, and was
well within code requirements for closing speed.

(Tr. p.

207, 217, 218.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

In light of the testimony of all the

physicians, the maintenance men, the Sears security officer
and the elevator expert, the jury awarded excessive damages to
the plaintiff.

There was a complete and consistent lack of

positive findings on five separate EMG and nerve study
tests.

After two years of claimed total "helplessness," there

was no muscle

atrophy or tests warranting the complaint.
-6-

Plaintiff's own treating physician suspected plaintiff's
veracity and concluded that the supposed injury was "no big
deal."

He testified that his patient's complaints likely

resulted from ulterior purposes rather than actual injury.
2.

The liability verdict is not supported by

substantial and competent evidence.

The only elevator expert

testified that at worst, there was a safe malfunction.
Testimony from all witnesses having elevator experience was
that the elevator was functioning safely and that the elevator
door speed was insufficient to cause injury.
A R G U M E N T
POINT I
A.

MR. EISENSTAEDT WAS AWARDED EXCESSIVE DAMAGES.
Utah law provides that a new trial is warranted where

the jury awarded "excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice."
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5).

An award is

properly set aside where the "jury disregards competent
evidence," or the award is so "excessive beyond natural
justification as to indicate the affect of improper factors in
the determination," or that it "clearly appears that the award
was rendered under [a] misunderstanding."

Bennion v.

LeGrand Johnson Construction. 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah
1985).

A new trial is also proper when the "jury verdict is

-7-

manifestly against the weight of evidence," Price Orem
Investment Co* v, Rollins, Brown & Gunnellf 713 P.2d 55,
58 (Utah 1986), or when the jury has "misapplied or failed to
take into account proven facts; . . . " Wellman v. Noble,
366 P.2d 701# 704 (Utah 1961).

(See also. Batty v.

Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978): "Generally the
amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for the jury and
unless such an award clearly indicates the jury's disregard of
competent evidence or the influence of passion or prejudice,
the trial court may not interfere with the jury's
determination.")
In this case, the extensive medical evidence was
uniformly against Mr. Eisenstaedt.

His own treating

physician, Dr. John Provost, and the testing physicians,
Dr. Ron Duerksen and Dr. Walter Reichert, consistently
testified there was no medical basis supporting
Mr. Eisenstaedt.

These three doctors were the only

physicians who testified at trial.
Dr. Provost was Mr. Eisenstaedt's treating
physician.

He saw Mr. Eisenstaedt at different times

beginning April 30, 1986, through December 12, 1986.
(Tr. p. 93, 246.)

On April 30, 1986, Mr. Eisenstaedt

complained of left arm and elbow pain radiating to the hand.
However, Mr. Eisenstaedt had used crutches for years prior to
the Sears' incident.

Dr. Provost concluded that the complaints
-8-

amounted to nothing more than "tennis elbow" which could be
caused by Mr. Eisenstaedt's continued use of crutches.
(Tr. p. 251.)

On April 3, 1986, an EMG test completed by

Dr. Dennis Thoen buttressed the diagnosis of a mild tennis
elbow.

The April 3, 1986 EMG findings were at best "mild."

Even "mild" findings, however, would result in substantially
normal use of the arm.

(Tr. p. 251.)

However, based on

Mr. Eisenstaedt's subjective complaints, Dr. Provost
immobilized Mr. Eisenstaedt's arm by applying a cast.
(Tr. p. 93.)
Dr. Provost saw Mr. Eisenstaedt again on May 3,
1986, while the patient was in the hospital for heart testing.
On May 22, 1986, Dr. Provost removed the cast.
(Tr. p. 103.)

On June 3, 1986, Dr. Ron Duerksen, at the

request of Dr. Provost, completed a second EMG and nerve
study.

Dr. Duerksen testified that he found that the arm was

normal, with no nerve damage or entrapment.

(Tr. p. 317.)

As time went on, Dr. Provost found it more difficult
to give credence to Mr. Eisenstaedt's complaints.

The only

evidence of any injury was Mr. Eisenstaedt's subjective
verbal complaints.

(Tr. p. 259.)

Also, even assuming some

"mild" findings from the April 3, 1986 EMG, the June 3, 1986
EMG finding showed that the "mild" problem had been
resolved.

(Tr. p. 257.)

-9-

On July 17, 1986, Dr. Provost filled out a disability
form allowing Mr. Eisenstaedt time off work.

Nevertheless,

Dr. Provost testified he had a hard time justifying the report
because of the minimal physical findings.

(Tr. p. 261.)

The

decision to entertain notions of impairment was based only on
Mr. Eisenstaedt's subjective complaints.

(Tr. p. 259.)

On July 22, 1986, a third EMG study was completed.
(Tr. p. 318.)
normal.

Again, Dr. Duerksen found that the arm was

He found no evidence to substantiate

Mr. Eisenstaedt/s complaints.

(Tr. p. 319-320.)

Dr. Provost

found it more difficult to accept Mr. Eisenstaedt's
complaints in the face of the continually normal EMG
reports.

He knew that an EMG test could not be faked and

fully accepted the EMG results.

(Tr. p. 254.)

To assure accurate testing, Dr. Provost ordered a
fourth EMG from a different physician.

Accordingly, on

August 13, 1986, Dr. Walter Reichert completed an EMG and
nerve study tests.

Dr. Reichert testified that the test

results were normal.

Based upon his findings, he would expect

normal use of the patient's arm.

(Tr. p. 235.)

Based on the results of the fourth EMG,
Mr. Eisenstaedt's claims of total "helplessness" and total
"disability" in his left arm strained his physician's belief.
If Mr. Eisenstaedt7s claims were genuine, Dr. Provost would
expect to see significant EMG findings.
-10-

(Tr. p. 260.)

Thus, Dr. Provost ruled out any consideration of surgery.
(Tr. p. 267.)
Dr. Provost's belief in his patient's veracity was
further strained as a result of a series of grip strength tests
he administered to Mr. Eisenstaedt.

Dr. Provost conducted

these tests to determine if relative strength between the right
arm and the left was substantially different.

The test

revealed that the right-hand grip strength was significantly
greater than the left-hand grip strength.

However, the

right-hand strength was so much greater, by factor of 28 to 1
at one point, that Dr. Provost suspected the integrity of
Mr. Eisenstaedt's attempt.

Dr. Provost testified that the

left-hand results were the weakest he had ever seen.

Given the

left-hand results, he would expect to see a completely severed
ulnar nerve (Tr. p. 270) or that the patient was suffering
from complete paralysis.

(Tr. p. 273.)

Mr. Eisenstaedt,

however, had a completely normal ulnar nerve and did not have
any arm paralysis.

Further, given the huge disparity between

the right- and left-hand grip strengths, Dr. Provost expected
to see a half-inch to one full inch atrophy in the left forearm
as compared to the right.

(Tr. p. 271.)

was no left forearm atrophy.

Nevertheless, there

(Tr. p. 272.)

Accordingly, it

appeared to Dr. Provost that Mr. Eisenstaedt was not really
trying (Tr. p. 272), or on the other hand, was trying to
artificially inflate his injury claim.
-11-

Dr. Provost ordered one final EMG for December 23,
1986.
EMG.

Dr. Duerksen completed Mr. Eisenstaedt's fifth
Again, test results were normal.

(Tr. p. 320.)

Dr. Provost came to the conclusion that in all
actuality, Mr. Eisenstaedt enjoyed the use of his arm.
(Tr. p. 275.)

Dr. Provost testified that he could not equate

the normal EMG's and lack of atrophy with Mr. Eisenstaedt's
complaints.

Dr. Provost concluded/ and so testified, that such

complaints were not typical unless the suing patient was after
some secondary gain or had ulterior motives in persisting with
the claim.

(Tr. p. 277.)

As a result, Dr. Provost did not

give any type of impairment or disability rating to the
plaintiff because the alleged injury, according to all the
medical evidence, was "no big deal."

(Tr. p. 274.)

The

damage award indicates that the "jury disregarded [the]
competent evidence," supplied by Dr. Provost, Dr. Duerksen,
Dr. Reichert, and Dr. Thoen.

Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1083.

The award was "manifestly against the weight of evidence,"
price Orem Inv. Co., 713 P.2d at 58, in the form of five
EMG nerve study tests totally discounting the plaintiff's
claims of nerve damage, and the treating physician's conclusion
that Mr. Eisenstaedt's supposed injury was "no big deal."
There was a total absence of evidence supporting plaintiff's
claims of "significant nerve damage" or severe injury to "both
arms."

(Plaintiff's Complaint, f 4, R. p. 3.)
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The overwhelming medical testimony correlates with
the testimony of Lisa Hurtado, the Sears' security agent.
She saw Mr. Eisenstaedt immediately after the alleged
incident.

She inspected his arms and noted the total absence

of bruises, scraping, contusions, lacerations, skin
indentations or redness. As a result, she noted there was "no
physical injury."

(Tr. p. 339.)

The medical evidence also accords with the elevator
testimony of Charles Schott, Lisa Hurtado, David Joseph and
Mont Anderson.

David Joseph examined the elevator just after

the incident occurred.

He found that the door speed was normal

and the closing devices acted properly.

(Tr. p. 332.)

Lisa

Hurtado also put her arm in the elevator immediately after
the incident and found that the door closing speed was
insufficient to cause any injury to her arm.

(Tr. p. 343.)

Elevator expert Charles Schott testified that the door speed
was proper.

The manifest weight of evidence and the disregard

of competent testimony led to an excessive award.

Thus, a new

trial is warranted.

B.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT.
Under Rule 59(a)(6), a new trial is proper where

there is "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict . . . "

An "insufficiency challenge" is appropriate

where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
-13-

prevailing party, is "insufficient to support the verdict."
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).

The party

challenging the verdict must "marshal all of the evidence
supporting the verdict" and then show that the "evidence is
insufficient to support it."
766, 769 (Utah 1985).

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d

While the burden on the appellant is not

light, Cambelt International Co. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239,
1242 (Utah 1987), if the evidence is "completely lacking or is
so slight and convincing as to make the verdict plainly and
reasonable and unjust" a new trial is warranted.
Feredav, 739 P.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1987).

King v.

See also.

Peats v. Commercial Security Bank. 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah
App. 1987).
In this case the jury found in favor of Otis
Elevator on the negligence issue, but against Otis regarding
breach of warranty of fitness and strict liability.

The only

evidence supporting verdicts on the breach of warranty and
strict liability came from Mr. Eisenstaedt.
Mrs. Eisenstaedt testified that the elevator doors came into
contact with Mr. Eisenstaedt7s arms for approximately five
seconds before releasing and released after she touched the
elevator button.

(Tr. p. 145.)

Nevertheless, on

cross-examination she admitted that she was "not good at time"
and that, in her deposition, testified that the door closed on
Mr. Eisenstaedt for one to two minutes.
-14-

(Tr. p. 153.)

After the doors released Mr. Eisenstaedt, she pushed him into
the elevator in order to continue shopping.

(Tr. p. 154.)

On its face, Mrs. Eisentaedt's testimony is so "slight and
unconvincing" that it cannot support the verdict.

The incident

was so unremarkable to her that after the doors opened
releasing her husband's arms, she continued her normal shopping
routine.

She went into the elevator to go to the next floor.
Mr. Eisenstaedt's testimony about the incident does

not add anything substantial.

He stated that the doors opened

for two to three seconds and then closed on his elbows for a
couple of seconds.

(Tr. p. 78.)

He said that the elevator

doors caused "severe pain" to his elbows, (Tr. p. 32.) and
later alleged "severe nerve damage."

However, his own

physician testified that there was no nerve damage and
subsequently described the injury as "no big deal."

The

overwhelming medical testimony demonstrates the insufficiency
of Mr. Eisenstaedt's claim of nerve damage.

Indeed, five

EMG reports absolutely refute the claim.
Plaintiff also called elevator expert Charles
Schott in his liability case.

Mr. Schott did testify that,

assuming the truth of Mr. Eisenstaedt's testimony, the
opening and closing of the doors would represent an unintended,
minor malfunction.

(Tr. p. 172, 175 and 191.) Nevertheless,

he testified it would be a safe malfunction because the door
speed was insufficient to cause any damage.
-15-

(Tr. p. 175.)

Thus, even assuming malfunction, the elevator door was fit for
safe passenger travel.

(Tr. at 175.)

The door closing speed

was well within the safety code specifications of thirty pounds
of thrust.

(Tr. at 207.)

In sum, Mr. Schott testified

that the elevator did not contain any dangerous defect and that
it was fully fit and safe for its intended purposes.

(Tr. p.

217.)

C O N C L U S I O N
On the basis of the foregoing reasons, Otis
Elevator respectfully requests a new trial.
DATED this 21

day of July, 1990.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

Bruce R.Garner
Attorneys*' for Defendant
Otis Elevator Company
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F&£DS<$TR!CTCmiRT
Third Judicial District

JUL 1 9 1989
h SALT w*s cowry
OftpotyCtorfc

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT EISENSTAEDT,
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 860909577PI

vs.
OTIS ELEVATOR,

Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendant.
We, the jury, based upon a preponderance of the
evidence find on the Special Verdict submitted to us as follows:
1.

At the time and place in question and under the

conditions as shown by the evidence, was the defendant, Otis
Elevator, negligent?
Yes

No

If your answer is Yes, go on to Question No. 2.

If your answer

is No, go to Question No. 3.

x

Was such negligence a proximate cause of injury to

the plaintiff?
Yes

No

Go on to Question No. 3.

o.v

(i)

7'
3.

Did the functioning of the Otis elevator in

question on April 9, 1986 breach the defendant's implied warranty
of merchantability?
Yes
Ls^

J^I

No

If your answer to isv Yes, go on to Question No. 4.

If your

answer is No, go on to Question No. 5.
4.

Was the defendant's breach of that implied

warranty of merchantability a proximate cause of injury to the
plaintiff?
Yes

\jS

No

Go on to Question No. 5.
5.

Did the functioning of the Otis elevator in

question on April 9, 1986 breach the defendant's implied warranty
of fitness for particular purpose?
Yes

^ ^ ^

No

If your answer is Yes, go on to Question No. 6.

If your answer

is No, go on to Question No. 7.
6.

Was the defendant's breach of that implied

warranty of fitness for particular purpose a proximate cause of
injury to'the plaintiff?
Yes
Go on to Question No. 7.

No

7.

Was the elevator in question in a defective

condition unreasonably dangerous to the user?
Yes

\y^

No

If your answer is Yesf go on Question No. 8.

If your answer is

No, go on to Question No. 9.
8.

Was that defective condition of the elevator in

question a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff?
Yes

\*r^

No

Go on to Question No. 9.
9.

If you answered Yes to Questions 1 and 2 or Yes to

Questions Nos. 3 and 4 or Yes to Questions Nos. 5 and 6 or Yes to
Questions Nos. 7 and 8, please answer Question No. 10.

If not,

return this Special Verdict to the bailiff now.
10.

What amount would fairly and adequately compensate

the plaintiff for the injuries he sustained as a result of the
accident in question?
Special Damages

$

General Damages

$

TOTAL
DATED this

/ ~7

35'£

. {?£>

^£r~~~~* *HT. /f /iC^

$ /~V V ' J7»T7**7*»

/<? day of July, 1989.
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GORDON K. JENSEN - A4351
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 04107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT EISENSTAEDT,
i
i

Plaintiff,
vs.

;

OTIS ELEVATOR,

JUDGMENT ON
THE VERDICT
Civil No. 860909577PI
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
This matter was tried to a jury on July 17 , 18 and 19,
1989, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding.

Gordon K. Jensen of

Robert J. DeBry and Associates represented the plaintiff.

Bruce

R. Garner of Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson represented the
defendant.

The liability of the defendant was submitted to the

jury on four theories:

Negligence; breach of implied warranty of

merchantability; breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose; and strict products liability.
The jury returned a verdict finding that the defendant
was

not

implied

negligent, but that
warranties

of

the defendant

merchantability

and

had breached
fitness

for

its
a

particular purpose and that the elevator in question was in a

(ii)

defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate user
or consumer and, therefore, liable to the plaintiff under strict
products liability.
The jury further found that these breaches of implied
warranty and the defective condition of the elevator were the
proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.
Based

on

those

findings

of liability and causation

against the defendant, the jury returned the following verdict on
damages:
What

amount

would

fairly

and

adequately

compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he
sustained

as a result

of the accident in

question?
Special Damages

$17,250.00

General Damages

5,000 . 00

TOTAL

$22,250.00

The verdict was appropriately dated and signed by the
foreperson.

Based upon the Special Verdict of the jury;

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as
follows:
1.

The

plaintiff

is

awarded

judgment

against

defendant for special damages in the amount of $17,250.
2

the

2.

The

plaintiff

is

awarded

$4,521-78

as

pre-

judgment interest on special damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-27-44.

This represents interest at 8% per annum on $17,250

from April 9, 1986 to July 19, 1989.
3.

The plaintiff

is awarded

judgment

against

the

defendants for general damages in the amount of $5,000.
4.
against

the

The plaintiff
defendant

is awarded post-judgment interest

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

§15-1-4,

consistent with this judgment, accruing at the rate of 12% per
annum.
5.

The plaintiff is awarded his costs of court in the

amount of $543.95.

DATED this

day of

, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

F.RANK G, NOEL
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

BRUCE R. GARNER
Attorney for the Defendant
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day of y ^

iXJj^j

v
1989, a true and correct
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THE
:t copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT^ON

VERDICT

(Eisenstaedt v. Sears, et al) was mailed, U.S. Mail,

postage prepaid to the following:

Bruce R. Garner
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorney for Defendant Otis Elevator Company
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT
84110

2185-009/ek

^
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JOHN L. YOUNG (A3591)
BRUCE R. GARNER (A4322)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant Otis Elevator Co.
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. BOX 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT EISENSTAEDT,
DEFENDANT OTIS ELEVATOR'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
A NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
SEARS ROEBUCK CO., and
OTIS ELEVATOR,
Defendants.

Civil No. C86-9577
Judge Frank G.'Noel

Defendant, Otis Elevator Company, pursuant to Rule
50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves this
Court for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the
alternative, a new trial.

This Motion is supported by the

Memorandum.

(iii)

DATED this

£»S>

day of -August, 1989.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

Bruce R. Garner
Attorneys for Defendant
Otis Elevator Company

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoina instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid
this Jpsf** day of August, 1989, to the following counsel of
record:
Gordon K. Jensen, Esq.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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JOHN L. YOUNG (A3591)
BRUCE R. GARNER (A4322)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant Otis Elevator Co.
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT EISENSTAEDT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

i
I
i
I

DEFENDANT OTIS ELEVATOR
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
FOR REMITTITUR

SEARS ROEBUCK CO., and
OTIS ELEVATOR,
Defendants.

1
l

Civil No. C86-9577
Judge Frank G.'Noel

Defendant, Otis Elevator Company, pursuant to Rule
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves this
Court for remittitur or a new trial.

A Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in support of this Motion is attached.

DATED this 2-S

day of August, 1939.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

Bruce R.
Attorneys fbr Defendant
Otis Elevator Company

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid
this ^j^^day of August, 1989, to the following counsel of
record:
Gordon K. Jensen, Esq.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
EISENSTAEDT, ROBERT
PLAINTIFF

CASE NUMBER 860909577 PI
DATE 09/28/89
HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK NP

VS
SEARS ROEBUCK CO
OTIS ELEVATOR

DEFENDANT

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. JENSEN, GORDON K.
D. ATTY. BURTON, ROBERT A.

THE COURT HAS REVIEWED DEFTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
A REMITTITUR TOGETHER WITH THE MEMOS FILED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND NOW RULES AS FOLLOWS: IT IS NOT FOR THE COURT TO WEIGH
THE EVIDENCE NOR TO SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE JURY
ON FACTUAL ISSUES. THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THERE WAS
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON BOTH THE LIABILITY AND DAMAGE ISSUES UPON
WHICH THE JURY COULD BASE ITS VERDICT. FOR THAT REASON AND FOR
THE REASONS STATED IN PLTFS MEMO THE COURT DENIES DEFTS MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A REMITTITUR. COUNSEL FOR PLTF IS TO
PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THIS RULING AND SUBMIT IT TO
THE COURT FOR SIGNATURE.

(iv)

Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in.law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial, § 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial,
Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

178

(V)

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
presenting the issue to trial court for final determination, trial court's determination that
jury had considered interest issue in its deliberation and that award in fact incorporated an
interest payment was not arbitrary or capricious and would not be altered on appeal. UteCal Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah
1980).
Objections to questions.
Where defendant did not object to questions
submitted in special verdict, he cannot on appeal raise the issue that the questions were
confusing. Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308
P.2d 264 (1957).
Proximate cause issue.
Where the case is submitted under a general
verdict, proximate cause is for the jury.
Milligan v. Capitol Furn. Co., 8 Utah 2d 383,
335 P.2d 619 (1959).
Role of jury.
—Special verdicts.
Special verdicts that plaintiff both suffered a
specified amount of damages and was guilty of
contributory negligence were not inconsistent
and thereby void, since in special verdict jury
finds facts and court applies law. Brigham v.
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470
P.2d 393 (1970).

Rule 50

Special interrogatories.
Whenever there is uncertainty or doubt in
connection with the correlation of interrogatories with each other and their answers, they
should be so interpreted as to harmonize with
the findings of the jury if that can-reasonably
be done. Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247
P.2d 273 (1952).
When a general verdict will settle the issues
it should be used, but the court should take
advantage of special verdicts when specific issues cannot otherwise be reached. Baker v.
Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 264 (1957).
There is no impropriety in submitting special interrogatories if the court so desires.
Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d
564 (1960).
Trial court did not err in submitting special
interrogatories instead of a general verdict as
requested by plaintiff. This rule sanctions such
procedure. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 15
Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964).
Where jury answers to special interrogatories submitted on all disputed material issues
are adverse to the defendant, the court properly entered judgment for the plaintiff. S & F
Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (Utah
1974).
Cited in Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591
(Utah 1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trial
§§ 1175 to 1181.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 526 to 573.
A.L.R. — Submission of special interrogatories in connection with general verdict under
Federal Rule 49(b), and state counterparts, 6
A.L.R.3d 438.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Competency of juror's statement or affidavit

to show that verdict in civil case was not correctly reported, 18 A.L.R.3d 1132.
Validity of verdict or verdicts by same jury
in personal injury action awarding damages to
injured spouse but denying recovery to other
spouse seeking collateral damages, or vice
versa, 66 A.L.R.3d 472.
Products liability: inconsistency of verdicts
on separate theories of negligence, breach of
warranty, or strict liability, 41 A.L.R.4th 9.
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 346 to 366.

Rule 50, Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict,
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.
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(vi)

Rule 50

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party,
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided
for m Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon
does not affect the finality of the judgment In case the motion for a new
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error m that denial; and if
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in
accordance with the order of the appellate court
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment,
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a
new trial shall be granted.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 50, F R C P
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid
this V I day of July, 1990, to the following counsel of record:
George Waddoups, Esq.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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